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I perform Arellano-Bond GMM estimations using panel data over the period 1995-2008 and 
explore the growth effects of Africa’s trade with China, distinguishing between the effect of 
imports and the effect of exports, and controlling for the role of export concentration. Four 
important  results are obtained from the empirical analysis. First, there is no empirical 
evidence that exports to China enhance growth unconditionally. Second, the results suggest 
that export concentration enhances the growth effects of exporting to China, implying that 
countries which export one major commodity to China benefit more (in terms  of growth) 
than do countries that have more diversified exports. Third, contrary to the widely held view 
that increasing  imports from China would have a negative effect, the empirical results show 
that the share of China in a country’s total imports has a robust positive effect on growth. 
Finally, the evidence suggests that there is an inverted-U relationship between exports to 
developed countries and growth in Africa. Overall, the results seem  to provide support for the 
hypothesis of growth  by destination (i.e., that  where a country exports matters for the 
exporting country’s growth and d evelopment) in the sense that exports to more developed 
(OECD) countries has (at least up to a threshold) a positive impact on growth but no such 
effect is unambiguously (unconditionally) shown in the case of exports to China. I draw on 
these findings to outline some policy implications. 
 
 
JEL classification: F1, F41, O2, O4 
 
   1 
By offering aid without preconditions, China has presented an attractive 
alternative to conditional Western aid, and gained valuable diplomatic support 
to defend its international interests. However, a generally asymmetrical 
relationship differing little from previous African–Western patterns, alongside 
support of authoritarian governments at the expense of human rights, make 
the economic consequences of increased Chinese involvement in Africa mixed 
at best, while the political consequences are bound to prove deleterious 
                                                                   Tull (2006, p. 459) 
 
   
1. Introduction 
 
David Ricardo’s comparative-advantage  theory  implies that countries do better by 
specializing as opposed to diversifying exports. With the publication of some seminal work on 
specialization in primary products in the 1950s (Prebisch, 1950 and 1959; and Singer, 1950), 
development economists have been stressing the l ink between concentration, especially in 
primary products, and the terms-of-trade deterioration (Sachs and Warner, 1999, 2000 and 
2001; Sachs and Rodriguez, 1999). In the case of Africa (and Latin America), the bulk of the 
empirical evidence (Sachs and Warner 2001; Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana 2007; 
Baliamoune-Lutz 2009a; Collier and Goderis, 2009), at least until recently, has been, more in 
favor of the Prebisch-Singer proposition. Given the recent developments in the markets for 
primary commodities (higher global demand for many) it would be interesting to explore 
whether recent African trade data, particularly data on trade with China, still validate the 
Prebisch-Singer proposition 
 
The composition of trade can be determined by many factors including ties to former colonial 
powers and the needs of major trading partners (which often are also former colonizers) and 
proximity to large markets (for example, Africa’s exports to Europe). It is quite plausible that 
the  destination of exports could play an important role in determining a country’s trade 
patterns and, hence, its development trajectory.  In theory, there are various channels 
through which the destination of a country’s export could influence long-term growth and the 
patterns of development (Baliamoune-Lutz,  2010). One channel may stem from export-
related inward foreign direct investment (FDI targeting specific export sectors) in mineral 
and mining sectors, for example. When countries invest in these sectors in a developing 
country and use their own firms (or MNCs) in the host country , it is likely that such firms 
would have an influence on labor markets. For example, they may have an effect on labor 
standards, labor union bargaining power, or the extent of social protection, with implications 
for asset ownership, education and health, and thus may have—at least for the region where   2 
the investment is taking place—an important impact on long-term growth and development. 
Certain types of FDI may also have a negative effect on the quality of institutions and 
governance. Finally, export-related FDI in mineral rich countries may crowd out other 
sectors (in particular manufacturing) that may be  vital to long-term growth. The level of 
development in the importing country also may matter (Arora and Vamvakidis, 2 005). An 
economy (especially one as large as the Chinese economy) that is in its medium stages of 
development would in general have a growing manufacturing sector and plausibly increasing 
wages for the labor employed in the expanding sectors. Hence, demand for consumption 
goods and natural resources (especially fuel) would be growing. On the other hand, import of 
manufactures (and, later on, industrial goods) would be restricted. Yet when its trade 
partners are also developing countries, they may want to expand the manufacturing sector 
but would not be able to do so if export markets are limited. This, indeed, seems to be  the 
current situation of the trade relationship between most African countries and China. 
 
There is currently a significant debate about China’s increased engagement in Africa. While 
many stress that China’s interest in Africa i s new and focuses primarily on the continent’s 
wealth of natural resources (including land), historical facts indicate that Sino-African 
relations go b ack to ancient times and China has  played an  active diplomatic and political 
role in Africa for over 50 years now,1 and its current engagement in Africa involves more than 
just trade in natural resources. As argued by Gill and Reilly (2007),  “China’s current 
engagement in Africa is rooted in more than 50 years of friendly, respectful, and supportive 
relations between China and African countries. Beijing was quick to assist the emergent 
nations of postcolonial Africa even at a time when China was itself isolated, poor, and beset 
with internal upheavals.” Moreover, China’s policy of noninterference  which has served to 
safeguard China’s own sovereign rights (Anshan, 2007) is appealing to many (perhaps most) 
African leaders and Africa’s citizens who maintain that China treats  them as equal and, 
something they feel, the West has generally failed to show in its dealings with Africa.  
 
Yet, there is a large pool of skeptics mainly in the West (and among some Africans) that 
China’s hunger for natural resources implies that it would do anything to get them including 
helping maintain tyrannical regimes that benefit from natural resource  revenues, and thus 
would retard or prevent political and economic reforms in those countries. In addition, there 
are some who fear that China’s growing economic engagement in Africa may have a severe 
                                                  
1 In the early 1990s, there was still debate whether Africa matters to China (see Segal 1992).   3 
negative impact on the environment. However, without any empirical testing, these 
hypotheses may remain mere speculations.  
 
For economists undertaking research on Africa in particular a major question that  is 
frequently being raised nowadays is the impact of the Sino-African trade on development and 
growth in Africa. 2 Since labor costs in China are generally lower than wages in most of the 
rest  of the world, and given the way GDP is computed and the large  body of literature on 
exports and growth, it is often tempting to focus the debate on the impact of imports (from 
China) and take as given that the impact of export to China is positive. Recent studies have 
focused on the effects of increased imports on African firms and workers, and growth (see, 
for example, Gebre-Egziabher, 2007). Interestingly, Maswana (2009) uses Toda-Yamamoto’s 
version of Granger causality and tests whether trade with China could trigger economic 
growth in Africa, focusing on South Africa and Kenya as a proxy for African economies. The 
author obtains evidence suggesting that it is imports from —not exports to— China that seem 
to have  positive effect on growth in two countries. Indeed, in the case of Africa increasing 
exports to China m ay raise  at least two  particularly  pertinent questions.  First, given the 
evidence reported in the literature on the impact of export diversification on development 
and growth, Africa’s high concentration in primary commodities implies that the continent 
may or may not benefit from increasing exports to China. Export concentration in primary 
commodities  has been linked to conflict,  inefficiency of institutional and policy  reforms 
(Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007), macroeconomic instability, and ineffectiveness of 
aid ( Fosu, 1990 and 1996; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009a). Second, in the past, exports of large 
amounts of natural resources went to  highly  developed countries. Certainly, China  has 
recently been growing at a fast rate but it is still far from being a developed country, at the 
level of Africa’s rich trade partners (EU and U.S., for example). This highlights two important 
points: (1) China’s demand for natural resources will not fall or even stop increasing any time 
soon, and (2) because it is still a developing country (based on per-capita income) and one 
with a vast pool of unskilled labor, China will still (for many years to come) compete and 
mostly win against other developing countries on the basis of labor costs, especially unskilled 
labor wages. Thus, we should expect its exports to the world, including Africa, to keep on 
growing which may contribute to  preventing or at least  delaying production (and export) 
diversification in Africa. Therefore, given these issues and the fact that a substantial portion 
                                                  
2 There is an emerging body of research on this topic. See for example, Goldstein et al., (2006), Broadman, 
(2007), Zafar (2007), and Maswana (2009).   4 
of Africa’s exports to China consists of primary commodities, it would be more interesting to 
study the impact of exports to China on growth (and development) in Africa.  
 
In this paper I primarily try to explore this point by using annual data over the period 1995-
2008 and  examining the effects of exports to China (measured as the share of exports to 
China in the exporting country’s GDP) on growth. More specifically, I try to address the 
following two questions. First, do exports to China promote growth in Africa? Second, does 
export concentration matter to the relationship between exports and growth? To do so, I use 
the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator to take into account the issue of endogeneity. I control for 
other major factors that could influence grow th, particularly export diversification and the 
share of exports to the rest of the world (developed countries). Four  important results are 
obtained from the empirical analysis. First,  there is no empirical evidence that exports to 
China enhance growth unconditionally, while there is strong evidence that exporting to the 
rest of the world has a positive impact on growth in Africa. Second, the results suggest that 
export concentration (using two different measures) enhances the growth effects of exporting 
to China, this implies that countries which export one major commodity to China (such as 
Angola or Sudan) benefit more (in terms of growth) than countries that have more diversified 
exports (for example South Africa). Third, contrary to the widely held view that increased 
imports from China would have a negative effect, the empirical results indicate that the share 
of China in a country’s total imports has a robust positive effect on growth. Finally,  the 
evidence suggests that there is an inverted-U relationship between exports to the rest of the 
world (excluding China) and growth in Africa. Overall, the results seem to provide support 
for the hypothesis of growth by destination— that where a country exports matters for the 
exporting country’s growth and development—(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2010), in the sense that 
exports to more developed countries have (at least up to a threshold) a positive impact on 
growth but no such effect is unambiguously (unconditionally) shown in the case of exports to 
China.   
 
This study aims to make a novel and significant contribution to the literature on growth and 
development in Africa. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine the 
impact of export destination on growth, focusing on Africa’s exports to China and controlling 
for export concentration. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the main characteristics of trade between Africa and China since 1995. Section 3   5 
presents the variables and methodology. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. The final 
section summarizes and comments on the policy implications of the findings.  
 
 
2. Trade between Africa and China: An overview 
 
Africa-China trade has seen an impressive increase since 2000 (Figure 1).  However, trade 
with China does not involve all African countries to a similar extent. China’s major imports 
from Africa tend to be concentrated on a small group of countries. In 2008, 62 percent of 
Africa’s trade with China involved five countries (China’s major trade partners in Africa), 
Angola (24% of total Africa’s trade with China), South Africa (17%), Sudan (8%), Nigeria (7%) 
and Egypt (6%). Figure 2 portrays the evolution of trade between China and each of the five 
countries over the period 1995-2008. We note that Angola and (since 2000) Sudan are 
mainly exporters to China. On the other hand, Egypt and Nigeria are  significant net 
importers, while South Africa seems to maintain a balanced trade with China. In terms of the 
proportion of trade with China in each country’s GDP, the  countries differ significantly.  For 
example, in 2008, Angola’s exports to China represented about 25 percent of its GDP, while 
Sudan’s exports were about 11 percent of its GDP.  
 
In general, exports from most African countries trading with China are predominantly from 
their top one or two commodities. In 2008, imports of crude oil from Africa constituted over 
70 percent of total Chinese imports from the continent. More than 50 percent of total imports 
by China from Africa in 2008 came from two suppliers of crude oil, Angola (40%) and Sudan 
(11%). Indeed, crude oil represents nearly 100 percent of Angola’s and Sudan’s exports to 
China. Cotton constituted 100 percent of Burundi’s exports to China. Even countries that 
export a variety of commodities to  China, such as South Africa, have exports that are 
concentrated in a relatively limited group of commodities. The share of the top 5 exported 
commodities is generally around 70 percent (or higher) of their total exports to China. On the 
other hand,  imports from China are quite diversified as  African countries import a wide 
variety of Chinese products. In 2008 the top 20 exported commodities to Africa constituted 
only about 35 percent of China’s total exports to the continent. The top 20 imported products 
imported (from China) by South Africa and Egypt accounted for a mere 34 percent of each 
country’s total imports from China. For many other African countries this percentage is lower 
than 50 percent. Thus, a main feature of the Sino-African trade is the high concentration of   6 
African exports to China and strong diversification in Africa’s imports from China. While it is 
expected that China will for many years to come continue to need primary commodities to 
implement its industrialization strategy, it is nonetheless interesting and useful to African 
policymakers to explore the growth effects of the growing trade with China, in the presence of 
high export concentration.  
 
 
3. Export concentration and growth: A brief review 
 
The structure of trade can be critical to long-term growth (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 
2007). Some studies examined the effect of exporting manufactures on growth if all (or most) 
developing countries try to export manufactures—the fallacy of composition (Cline 1982, 
1984, and 2008; Ranis, 1985; Martin; 1993). Others focused on the composition of exports 
and its impact on growth and development. For example, Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 
(2007) show that the specialization patterns of otherwise similar countries can result in 
differences in economic development. Mazumdar (1996) posits that the composition of trade 
is a major determinant of the strength of the ‘engine of growth.’ Other studies, including 
Lewer (2002), and Lewer and Van den Berg (2003) find evidence suggesting that countries 
that export consumer goods and import capital goods grow faster than those that export 
capital goods. In the case of Africa, as argued in Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007), 
this implies that “the recent export boom which is driven by capital-intensive sectors such as 
oil is not likely to generate growth that is sustainable, especially because of the low gains in 
employment creation and limited spillover effects on non-oil sectors.”  
 
Hesse (2008) presents empirical evidence in support of a nonlinear link between export 
diversification and per capita income, with developing countries benefiting from diversifying 
their exports, whereas most advanced countries perform better with export specialization. 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) find that export diversification enhances the 
growth effects of trade in Africa, especially at high levels of openness to trade. The authors 
note that the findings may suggest “diversification allows a country to sustain higher growth 
by increasing its resilience to shocks due to, among others, the vagaries of international 
commodity markets and weather changes.” Similarly, Baliamoune-Lutz (2009a) obtains 
empirical evidence suggesting that openness to trade may have adverse effects in fragile 
states (in Africa) in the presence of high export concentration. Carrère et al. (2009) find an   7 
inverted-U relationship between economic development and export diversification where the 
turning point occurs around $24,000 per capita (PPP). This implies that there is a re-
concentration of exports above a threshold income of $24,000; i.e., in more developed 
countries. Finally, Agosin (2008) finds that export diversification alone and interacted with 
the volume of export has a highly significant positive impact in a sample including Asian and 
Latin American countries 
 
Hausmann et al. (2007) show that, in the presence of (information) externalities, 
endowments may not fully determine a country’s specialization patterns. The authors develop 
a theoretical model where local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers and show that 
specialization patterns become partly indeterminate, and conclude that the mix of goods that 
a country produces may have important implications for economic growth. They construct an 
index of the ‘income level of a country’s e xports’ and use it to show that the empirical 
evidence validates their proposition; the index indeed predicts subsequent economic growth. 
Based on their findings, Hausmann et al. (2007) argue that “[c]ountries can get stuck with 
lower-income goods because  entrepreneurship in cost discovery entails important 
externalities. Countries that are able to overcome these externalities—through policies that 
entice entrepreneurs into new activities–can reap the benefits in terms of higher economic 
growth”(p. 24). 
 
However, other studies find that there is no evidence of a negative impact (Lederman and 
Maloney, 2003) or that the relationship between resource abundance and output level  is 
actually positive (Ng,  2005).  Countries like the United States, Finland  and Sweden for 
example, successfully achieved growth as a result of natural resource-based production 
(Wright and Czelusta, 2002; Blomoström and Kokko, 2003). Bebczuk and Berrettoni (2006) 
try to explain export diversification using data for 56 developed and developing countries 
including six African economies (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia) 
covering the period 1962-2002.   Surprisingly,  Bebczuk and Berrettoni find that variables 
such as exports, GDP, investment rate, credit, infrastructure, which are normally associated 
with good macroeconomic performance, “act in favor of more concentration rather than more 
diversification.” This result suggests that export  concentration  may increase with 
development 
 
     8 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Data and methodology 
 
This paper uses variables that are  typically used in growth equations (see for example 
Mankiw et al., 1992). In the growth literature, t hese variables include initial income (GDP) 
per-capita,  investment (% of GDP), and an indicator of human capital.  However,  in the 
present study the latter is omitted because  the data on our indicator of human capital 
(secondary schooling rate) are not collected on a regular basis for most countries and this 
makes the  sample too small.  In addition, the literature reports high correlation between 
initial income and human capital and this study controls for initial income. The study covers 
all African countries for which there are data on all the relevant variables. Unless otherwise 
specified, Africa refers to the entire continent (including North Africa). A description of the 
variable is provided in Appendix A. 
 
The growth equation used in this paper also accounts for the role of other relevant variables. 
First, I control for trade with China, using the share of exports and imports in the (African) 
country’s GDP.  This would help elucidate the first question I address in this study (do 
‘exports to China’ promote growth in Africa?). I also control for openness to international 
trade (open) and for exports to the rest of the world (exp_ROW). In general, t he  existing 
empirical evidence does not provide unequivocal support for a positive impact of trade on 
growth, especially in the case of African countries. Recent empirical research shows either 
that trade liberalization is not significantly associated with growth or that trade liberalization 
may,  in fact, have  an adverse effect on growth  (Mukhopadhyay, 1999; Baliamoune-Lutz, 
2002 and 2009b; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz , 2006; 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007). Mukhopadhyay (1999) finds that the liberalization 
of imports for some SSA countries caused growth to fall in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Baliamoune (2002 and 2009) finds that openness to trade in Africa led income in poorer 
countries t o grow slower relative to higher-income countries, hence leading to  income 
divergence, rather than convergence, within  the continent. Thus, determining the overall 
effect of trade remains an empirical question. Second, I control for the quality of institutions 
and the quality of government using an indicator of the rule of law and an indicator of 
government effectiveness. There is a large body of empirical literature on the important role 
of institutions in development and growth (see for example, Rodrik et al., 2004, Acemoglu et   9 
al., 2003, Dollar and Kraay, 2003, and  Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009a). Third, I control for the 
level of financial development in the country by including a measure of credit to the private 
sector (credit). While in theory financial development  contributes positively to growth, and 
stylized facts show a positive correlation between the two, the empirical  evidence on the 
direction of causality remains mixed. Fourth, I control for export concentration in primary 
commodities.  There exists an  important body of empirical work on the role of natural 
resources in development. In the case of Africa, most empirical studies find a negative 
relationship between  natural resources and development (Humphreys, 2005; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007) through various 
channel, including low investment in education and infrastructure, conflict, corruption, and 
poor institutions. I use two indicators of export concentration: the ratio of primary products 
in the top 5 exports (primary) and a dummy variable for oil exporting (oil), taking the value 
of 1 if the country is a major oil exporter and zero otherwise. Including indicators of export 
concentration may provide evidence that could help answer the second question in this paper 
(does ‘export concentration matter’ to the relationship between export to China and 
growth?). If there is evidence for a significant positive impact of export diversification in 
Africa then this would suggest introduction of new exports could be a source of growth which 
would have significant implications for the need of advancement on the technological frontier 
and for trade policy, education reform, and the type of products imported by African 
countries. 
 
I focus in particular  on the relationship between growth in GDP per-capita and the share of 
exports to China as a ratio of the exporting country’s GDP using the following basic model 
 
yi,t = ayi,t-1 + X i,t ß  + hi + xt + ei,t           (1) 
 
where  y is  growth income per capita in log form and  X is a row vector of the factors 
determining growth, some of which are endogenous,  hi   is the individual (country) fixed 
effect, xt is a time-specific effect, and  ei,t  are disturbances assumed (initially) to be serially 
uncorrelated.   
 
This paper uses the Arellano-Bond GMM-DIF estimator to estimate the relationship between 
exports to China and growth in Africa, controlling for several relevant variables. Since we are 
using panel data we have to deal with random and fixed effects. The presence of random   10 
effects creates correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable. The 
Arellano-Bond  GMM estimator (Arellano and  Bond. 1991) minimizes t his problem. It 
differences the endogenous and predetermined variables and uses lags of their own levels as 
instruments.  We treat investment, openness to trade, exports to China, imports from China, 
exports to the rest of the world (developed countries), institutions and financial development 
as endogenous variables. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
  
Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients among relevant variables. We note that the 
correlation between exports to China and growth (and initial income)  in Africa is very weak 
(0.16), while the correlation of exports to China and the two indicators of institutional quality 
is significant and negative. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
exports to China and openness (0.32) and export concentration (0.24). On the other hand, 
export to the rest of the world has a stronger association with initial income (exceeding 0.5), 
investment (0.32), openness (0.9) and positive, but weak in magnitude, correlation with 
institutional quality. Interestingly, the correlation between exports to China and exports to 
the rest of the world is only 0.28. 
 
Table 2 reports the results from the Arellano-Bond GMM estimations. In the basic equations 
(columns 1 and 2) the focus  is  on trade with China distinguishing between imports and 
exports. The only coefficient that is strongly statistically significant (at the 1-percent level) is 
the one on imports to China, implying imports to China have a positive influence on growth 
in Africa. Interestingly, exports to the rest of the world (exp_ROW) do not appear to have an 
impact (including imports—not shown —from the rest of the world does not change the 
results). In columns 3 and 4, I account for the effect of export concentration in primary 
commodities (including crude oil). Again, there is no evidence that exports to China have a 
positive impact. In fact the coefficient on the variable  ‘exp_to_China’ is negative (in all four 
equations) but statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, export concentration seems to have a 
positive effect on growth. The coefficient on the variable primary is positive and significant 
at the 10-percent level. In column (5), I include the interplay of exports to China and export 
concentration. The results indicate that higher export concentration actually enhances the   11 
growth effects of exporting to China. The independent effect from exporting to China is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10-percent level. 
 
The results reported in Table 3 are from estimations including a dummy variable for oil 
exporters (oil) instead of the variable primary. The results regarding the growth impact of 
China-bound exports are similar to the ones reported in Table 2. There is no direct 
(independent) positive effect from exporting to China. Exporting crude oil, in general, has a 
negative impact. This result is consistent with the evidence in  the empirical l iterature on 
growth and natural resources in Africa. However, the growth effects in countries that export 
primarily crude oil to China are positive. This seems consistent with the recent growth in oil 
exporting countries, since we observe high GDP growth in countries that have high volume of 
exports of crude oil to China, such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Further specifications are carried out in order to test the robustness of these results. In the 
equations shown in column (1) under the headings ‘CON = primary’ and ‘CON = oil’ in Table 
4, and after dropping most of the insignificant variables (estimating the same equations with 
these variables does not change the results), I try to assess the presence of nonlinearities by 
including the squared export to China and the squared export to the rest of the world. The 
results indicate that no matter which measure of concentration is used, there is no evidence 
of this type of nonlinearity in the case of export to China. On the other hand, the statistical 
evidence suggests an inverted-U relationship between  exports to the rest of the world and 
growth in African countries. In column (2) under both headings, I include time dummies but 
the coefficient associated with ‘time’ is statistically insignificant. We note that the coefficient 
on the variable  invest (investment ratio) now has better statistical significance. In addition, 
there is some evidence that there may be a growth momentum, as the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable (growth) is positive and significant at the 10-perecent level. 
Importantly, the evidence related to the impact of trade with China is quite robust.  
 
 
5.  Summary and policy implications 
 
Four important results are obtained from the empirical analysis. First, there is no empirical 
evidence that exports to China enhance growth unconditionally, while there is strong 
evidence that exporting to OECD countries has a positive impact on growth in Africa. This   12 
seems to provide support for  the hypothesis of growth by destination (i.e., that where  a 
country exports matters for the exporting country’s growth and development) in the sense 
that exports to more developed (OECD) countries is (at least up to a threshold) growth 
enhancing but no such effect is unambiguously (unconditionally) shown in the c ase of 
exports to China.  Second, the  evidence suggests that export concentration enhances the 
growth effects of exporting to China. T his implies that countries  which  export primary 
products  to China (such as Angola or Sudan) benefit more (in terms of growth) than 
countries which have more diversified exports (such as South Africa). Third, contrary to the 
widely held view that increased imports from China would have a negative impact on growth 
in Africa, the empirical results indicate that the share of China in a country’s total imports 
has a robust positive effect on growth. Finally, the evidence suggests that there is an inverted-
U relationship between exports to the rest of the world and growth in Africa.  This last result 
should raise concern, as it suggests  that  above a threshold level, the effect of exports on 
growth is negative, which is particularly significant as African countries further increase their 
exports to China.  Using the results in Table 2, it turns out that the turning point occurs when 
exports are 67% of GDP (or 70% using the results in Table 3). The list of countries that had a 
share of exports greater than two-thirds of GDP for three or more years  during the period 
1995-2008 includes Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, and  
Swaziland. 
 
The statistical evidence suggests that trade with China has an ambiguous effect. The results 
also suggest that the effects would be different for different countries, which has been stated 
in other studies (see, for example, Jenkins and Edwards, 2006). Interestingly, t here is  a 
significant positive (linear) effect from importing from China and it works (at least partly) 
through investment (see Table 5).  This seems to be consistent with the evidence in the 
empirical literature on African countries (see for example Maswana, 2009). Thus, African 
policymakers should  promote polices that aim at facilitating imports of investment (and 
investment aiding) goods from China. Equatorial Guinea, for example, already has over 70% 
of its imports from China in this type of goods.   
 
On the other hand, the effect from exporting to China is more complicated. The evidence 
derived in this paper indicates that only countries with highly concentrated exports  seem to 
benefit from exporting to China. Does  this mean that African countries should stay away 
from diversifying their exports to China?  Or should Africa join other developing and   13 
emerging countries and boost the manufacturing sector?  These are important policy 
questions that in order to be seriously tackled will very likely require different strategies for 
different countries in the continent. 
 
While the diversification of trading partners may, in theory, be good as it could minimize the 
risk of relying on a very small number of export markets, its b enefits may be greatly 
diminished (or reversed) in the presence of high export concentration in natural (especially 
non-oil) resources. On the other hand, the experience of many Latin American countries with 
diversification clearly shows that the relationship between diversification and growth is not 
automatic, as Latin America has for the most part failed to replicate the export-led growth of 
Asia’s  (fast-growing)  emerging economies. Interestingly, Lall et al. (2005) find that on the 
aggregate export sophistication does not have a strong relationship with growth rates. 
Moreover, exporting manufacturing products may require a strong trade capacity—to sell 
products in developed countries—which is still lacking in many African countries. Rankin et 
al. (2006) use micro-data from manufacturing firms in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Tanzania and explore the causes of poor exporting performance. The authors find that 
firm size is a robust determinant of the decision to export and find foreign ownership and 
skills to be significant determinants of exporting. Given that skilled labor is still in short 
supply, many African countries may find it difficult to boost export diversification through 
promoting manufacturing. In addition, the dependence on primary product export  can be 
linked to low absorptive capacity (Habiyaremye and Ziesemer,  2006; Wood and  Mayer, 
2001).  Thus, with the exception of countries that are already on a somewhat steady path of 
manufacturing-based export  diversification (e.g., South Africa, Mauritius and  Tunisia), 
African countries should try to explore other ways of boosting exports.  For example, 
enhancing agriculture through adoption of new technologies should be high on the list of 
options for a number of African countries.  Chandra and Osorio Rodarte (2007) argue that 
“Ghana’s path to a middle income status does not have to be paved with only manufactured 
products.” The authors suggest that a policy challenge for Ghana is to facilitate a 
“comprehensive package of sector specific policies dedicated to fostering the technological 
capabilities and specific nontradable public inputs.”  Indeed, African countries may need to 
pursue what Brenton et al. (2007) identify as  a policy portfolio approach to export 
diversification, involving the expansion of the range of markets into which existing products 
are sold (geographic diversification, including regional markets), the upgrading of the quality 
of existing products, including agricultural exports, and expanding the export of services.   14 
It is important to note that the widely held claim that trade with (and FDI from) China may 
be exacerbating the poor levels  of  institutional quality and governance in Africa (see Tull, 
2006; quoted on page 1 of this paper) seems to miss a crucial point: Africa seriously needs to 
develop its infrastructure and China seems willing (in exchange for trade relations) to 
provide significant contribution in this area.  Since their independence, many African 
countries  have gone through decades of very low investment in infrastructure and other 
crucial sectors of the economy. Quite often, aid conditionality played a role in this situation. 
No wonder then that when China offers aid and investment projects without the traditional 
types of conditionality, many African leaders (and their citizens) are  happy to accept. As 
noted by a spokesman of the Kenyan government, “[y]ou never hear the Chinese saying that 
they will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to tackle 
corruption. If they are going to build a road, then it will be built “(cited in USA Today on 
June 6, 2005). 
 
In a recent study of Africa’s growth turnaround, John Page (2009) argues: 
The fall in economic declines since 1995 is largely due to better 
macroeconomic policies, but changes in such “growth determinants” as 
investment, export diversification, and productivity have not accompanied the 
growth boom. Lack of change in these variables—and the significant role 
played by natural resources in sparking growth accelerations—suggest that 
Africa’s growth recovery was fragile, even before the recent global economic 
crisis.  
 
Thus, Africa’s trade and investment relationships with China should be aimed at enhancing 
infrastructure, human capital, and investment. Africa should promote  production sectors 
capable of absorbing the large surplus of unskilled labor but at the same time invest in the 
creation of human capital (skilled labor). African countries should exploit their position (and 
their growing market power) as world suppliers of much-needed primary commodities, and 
identify the type of natural resource management, export sophistication, and skill 
enhancement that would promote long-term growth.    15 
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Appendix A 
 Variable description 
 
Growth: Growth in GDP per capita, purchasing power Parity (ppp) value using (international 
$). 
exp_to_China: The share of exports to China in GDP (%), from UN-COMTRADE. 
Imp_from-China: The ratio of imports from China from GDP (%), from UN-COMTRADE 
Invest: Gross fixed capital formation as a ratio of GDP (%). 
Open: The sum of total imports and exports to GDP (%). 
Credit: The ratio of domestic credit to the private sector (%). 
income80: 1980 real income (GDP, ppp) per capita in log form. 
income90: 1990 real income (GDP, ppp) per capita in log from. 
gov_eff: Index of government effectiveness, from the World Bank database on governance. 
law:  Index of the rule of law, from the World Bank database on governance. 
primary: The ratio of primary products in the country’s top 5 exports. 
Exp_ROW: The ratio of exports to OECD countries to GDP (%), from UN-COMTRADE 
north: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is in North Africa and zero 
otherwise. 
oil: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is an oil exporter and zero otherwise. 
 
Source: Unless noted otherwise, all data are from the World Bank World Development 




Figure B1.   Average GDP growth in Africa (exc. North Africa) 
 
 Source: Broadman (2006, p. 7)   21 
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  exp_to_China  imp_from
-China 
growth  invest  open  credit  income80  income90  gov_eff  law  primary 
imp_from-China  -0.01                     
growth  0.16  0.01                   
invest  0.19  -0.01  0.33                 
open  0.32  0.09  0.15  0.54               
credit  -0.00  -0.01  0.05  0.19  0.18             
income80  0.13  -0.09  -0.01  0.22  0.34  0.33           
income90  0.09  -0.12  0.01  0.17  0.40  0.30  0.96         
gov_eff  -0.23  -0.12  0.18  0.32  0.17  0.56  0.37  0.43       
law  -0.31  -0.06  0.10  0.41  0.21  0.47  0.32  0.38  0.84     
primary  0.24  0.04  0.10  0.03  0.09  -0.19  0.01  -0.02  -0.17  -0.17   
exp_ROW  0.28  -0.038  0.11  0.32  0.90  0.19  0.50  0.57  0.19  0.19  0.13  
Table 2.  GMM estimates 
 
Dependent variable = growth in per-capita GDP (growth) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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All specifications pass the Sargan test (not reported). 
Equations are estimated with a constant (not shown). 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table 3. GMM estimation 
controlling for oil 
 
 
Dep. Variable: growth in per-capita GDP  (growth) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










































































































oil X exp_ROW        0.007 
(0.053) 
 




         
exp_ROW 
squared 
         













All specifications pass the Sargan test (not reported). 
Equations are estimated with a constant (not shown). 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
* , ** and *** represent significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively.   28 
Table 4. GMM estimation 
Robustness checks 
 
Dep. Variable: growth in per-capita GDP  (PPP) 
  CON = primary  CON= dummy for oil 
  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2)   





















































































time    0.035 
(0.031) 
    0.034 
(0.032) 
 












All specifications pass the Sargan test (not reported). 
Equations are estimated with a constant (not shown). 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
* , ** and *** represent significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively.   29 
Table 5. GMM estimation 
 
 
Dep. Variable: Investment ratio, % GDP (invest) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
















































North Africa  -0.427  
(0.319) 
   
time    0.031 
(0.107) 
 




    0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 









Adapted from Baliamoune-Lutz (2010) 
All specifications pass the Sargan test (not reported). 
Equations are estimated with a constant (not shown). 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
* , ** and *** represent significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent 
levels, respectively. 